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As much of the world’s leadership was not sure what to think of the emerging Nazi 
movement in the 1920’s through the 1930’s, Truman Smith clearly saw the dark potential of a 
Nazi led Germany. From 1920-1924, Smith served as assistant military attaché in Germany. 
While serving, Smith was the first American diplomat to interview Hitler. Smith reported on the 
manipulative sway Hitler had over the masses, as well as the danger the world could face if 
Hitler gained power. Smith returned to Germany later in his career and served as head military 
attaché from 1935-1939. During this stay, Smith orchestrated a wildly successful scheme to 
utilize the aviator Charles Lindbergh’s fame in order to gain intelligence on German air 
technology.  
Together, Smith and Lindbergh provided the United States with unprecedented 
intelligence on German military build-up; however, Smith’s reports were almost entirely ignored 
by the Roosevelt administration. A diverse combination of domestic political factors contributed 
to the poor reception Smith’s reports received. Most notably, Smith’s reports conflicted with 
Roosevelt’s plan for the United States. In addition, negative consequences from Roosevelt’s 
personal rivalry with Lindbergh flowed through to Smith. An examination of Smith’s story offers 
a clear example of how domestic political agendas clouded decision making in the United States 
government leading up to World War II.  
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Introduction 
 Truman Smith stands in history as a little-known but interesting American hero. 
After an accomplished military career leading up to and during World War II, Smith was 
seemingly forgotten. Smith’s name was seldom mentioned after World War II until his 
memoirs were published in 1984. Since then, intrigued historians and journalists have 
sporadically examined his strange story. History shows Smith to be an astoundingly 
successful figure in military intelligence. Though hampered by his lack of rank, Smith 
submitted intelligence reports from Germany on the growing Nazi movement while he 
was assigned to Berlin as an assistant military attaché from 1920-1924. From 1935-1938, 
Smith returned to Germany to serve as head military attaché. During this time, he 
submitted unprecedented reports on German military build-up. Part of the reason Smith’s 
intelligence efforts were exceptionally insightful was due to a scheme he developed in the 
summer of 1936 to utilize the fame of aviator Charles Lindbergh to gain better access to 
German air facilities. Despite Smith’s efforts and early warnings of German military 
build-up, his reports were dismissed by the Roosevelt administration. For his efforts, 
Smith was illogically labeled as alarmist and later as a Nazi sympathizer. The reasons 
behind these accusations were purely political. An examination of Smith’s story offers a 
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clear example of how domestic political agendas clouded decision making in the United 
States government leading up to World War II. 
After serving in combat during World War I, Smith served as a military observer 
and assistant attaché in Berlin from June 1920 to April 1924. In November of 1922, 
Smith became the first American diplomat to interview Hitler and subsequently 
submitted reports on Nazi developments that history shows to be nearly prophetic, even 
though he lacked rank and his reports were mostly ignored. However, he did forge 
relationships with German military figures that proved to be invaluable contacts when he 
returned to Berlin as head military attaché later in his career. During this first stint in 
Berlin, Smith submitted reports detailing Nazi movements and aims. These warnings 
came nearly a decade before other more pronounced voices began warning the rest of the 
world about Hitler.  
In the years between 1924 and 1935, Smith held various miscellaneous posts; 
most notably, from 1928 to 1932, Smith served as an instructor at the Fort Benning 
Infantry School, where General George Marshall was in command. During this time, 
Smith forged a close professional relationship with Marshall, and the general 
subsequently acted as Smith’s patron for the remainder of his career.  
Smith’s second posting in Berlin from 1935-1938 as head military attaché, which 
may be the most interesting historically, can be divided into two sections. From 1935 
through the first half of 1936, Smith struggled as his reports were widely dismissed by 
both the military and the Roosevelt administration. In November of 1936, however, 
Smith took a trip to Washington at his own expense to impress upon his military 
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superiors the seriousness of events. This trip was quite successful, and Smith received 
considerable support from the military going forward. In addition, Smith began utilizing 
Lindbergh in his air intelligence in the summer of 1936.  In combination with his newly 
acquired military backing and the support of Lindbergh, Smith’s reports received 
considerable circulation in the highest level of United States government from 1937-
1938. These reports, most notably the General Air Estimate of 1937, contained powerful 
language that vividly described the rapid expansion of the German military.  
After Smith was diagnosed with diabetes, and subsequently exited his post in 
Berlin, in December of 1938, he proceeded to work as a military adviser in Washington. 
During this time, 1939-1941, Smith came under fire from various figures in the Roosevelt 
administration. A diverse range of factors, most notably his history with Lindbergh, 
contributed to the attacks he received. Smith entered retirement in 1941, but returned to 
active duty after the attack on Pearl Harbor at the request of General Marshall. During the 
war, Smith served as a military advisor to General Marshall, and he retired with the rank 
of colonel in 1946. 
Though Smith’s reports on Hitler from the early 1920’s are certainly historically 
significant, his reports from the late 1930’s are even more so. Not only is the content of 
the reports militarily important, but the reception of the reports holds complicated 
political implications. Ultimately, the question remains: Why was Smith ignored? The 
answer to this question is complex and varies depending on timeframe. The first factors 
contributing to the reception Smith’s reports received start with domestic attitudes and 
opposing voices abroad in 1935 and 1936. 
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1935-1936 – Opposing Voices 
In 1935 and 1936, Smith faced several obstacles in impressing the developments 
of the German military on American leadership. The most documented explanation for 
Smith’s reports being undervalued involves his position. In the 1930’s, the Military 
Intelligence Division of the Army (G-2) was little respected and the position of military 
attaché was far from prestigious. These factors gain little mention in contemporary 
sources because allegations of Smith’s Nazi sympathy generally take the spotlight, but 
the lack of respect held for the post of military attaché was a real issue for Smith in 1935 
and 1936. 
The lack of respect for military attachés is well documented even outside of work 
referring to Smith. This poor reputation held by military attachés was matched by the 
inadequacies of the Military Intelligence Division. Smith details his thoughts on G-2 and 
his initial training for his 1935 Berlin post in his memoirs. Of his instruction, Smith 
recalls it to have been “cursory and quite inadequate,” to the extent that Smith felt he had 
gained nearly nothing from his training.
1
 In regards to G-2 as a whole, Smith recalls: “I 
saw at first hand how inadequately organized, staffed, and financed the Military 
Intelligence Division was. It became clear to me also that Military Intelligence was the 
orphan branch of the General Staff and the army as a whole and that military attachés 
lacked prestige and were little regarded or listened to.”
2
  
                                                 
1
 Ibid., 26. 
2
 Ibid., 26. 
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The CIA records that the struggles in G-2 were well known, and that among 
military officers, the post of military attaché was considered a dead end.
3
 The record 
provided by the CIA states that on the surface Military Intelligence presented that the 
post of military attaché was highly respected, and that attachés received top-notch 
training before being sent to their assignments. This image could not be further from 
reality. The reputation of posts in Military Intelligence was so poor that the most 
qualified officers could seldom be recruited to intelligence posts. In addition, the training 
in G-2 was so inadequate that attachés were often thrown into their posts so unprepared 
they could not even develop sensible reports.
4
  
Military attachés were also extremely underfunded. The job of attachés was far 
from easy: “Operating against odds, only too often in periods of tension, they must 
exercise discretion in all their procedures: they must retain from spying or other 
conspiratorial activities, and contacts likely to disturb regular ‘harmonious,’ peace-
conductive diplomatic relations between states.”
5
 Within the tight pressures of not 
upsetting international politics, attachés often gained the bulk of their information from 
social events. Considering this, the CIA website details the struggle the attaché corps 
faced in obtaining funding: “The United States was in a serious economic depression, and 
Congress was not about to increase MID's budget so that a few attachés could host 
cocktail parties in Paris, Berlin, Rome, London, Moscow, and Tokyo. Unfortunately, the 
annual appropriations battle reinforced the perception in the Army at large that the 
                                                 
3
 Central Intelligence Agency, “The Role of US Army Military Attachés Between the World Wars,” Last 
modified June 27, 2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/95unclass/Koch.html#ft1. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Alfred Vagts, The Military Attaché (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), ix. 
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attaché corps was nothing more than a well-heeled country club.”
6
 As Smith proved 
however, much could be gained from “cocktail parties.” 
Smith noted that his department’s lack of funding did limit his movements in 
Berlin considerably. Notably, Smith recalls the lack of funding limited his travel in a 
major way.
7
 In addition, Smith felt an espionage presence needed to be in Berlin, 
separated from the attaché corps, and as Smith noted, “not a penny for espionage was 
available to his office.”
8
 Overall, G-2 and the post of military attaché were neither 
respected, nor funded sufficiently. 
A problem Smith faced specifically concerning his post was his responsibility to 
report not only on the development of German ground forces but also on their rapidly 
expanding air force. Referring to himself in the third-person, Smith details the difficulty 
he faced in reporting on German air development: “The military attaché possessed as 
much, but no more, knowledge of air corps organization and tactics than did the average 
American infantry officer who had been trained in the army school system. This was 
small. His technical knowledge of air matters was negligible.”
9
 Kay Smith writes in her 
unpublished autobiography that her husband’s lack of aeronautical expertise weighed on 
him heavily, because even with his limited knowledge of air science, he knew something 
huge was occurring in Germany.
10
  
Smith attributed the lack of respect for his knowledge and the bad reputation of 
his title to his feeling that his reports were not being taken seriously in the General Staff 
                                                 
6
 CIA. 
7
 Truman Smith, 164. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Ibid., 75-76. 
10
 Kay Smith, 90. 
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or the Air Corps.
11
 The growing strength of the German Luftwaffe impressed Smith to 
the extent that Smith returned to the States at his own expense in November 1936 in an 
attempt to convince his superiors of the seriousness of events in Germany. Smith’s wife 
records that this trip was successful and he did succeed in convincing much of the 
military leadership he encountered of the growing threat in Germany.
12
    
By the end of 1936, Smith had gained considerable support in the military. This 
support would ultimately save his career when the political firestorm approached in 1940. 
Since the lack of respect for attachés and G-2 was substantial, the backing Smith received 
in Washington provided much needed support. Smith received support from, among 
others, General George Marshall and Bernard Baruch. These two men in particular were 
responsible for Smith’s reports being not only circulated in “the highest military 
circles”
13
 in the late 1930’s, but they made Smith’s work known to influential figures in 
the Roosevelt administration, and even the President himself.  
General Marshall, who became the Chief of Staff of the Army, served as Smith’s 
patron from when Smith first served under Marshall as an instructor at Fort Benning in 
1928 to when Smith retired in 1946. Marshall actually sent Smith’s General Air Estimate 
from November 1937 to the President as “an example of outstanding military 
intelligence.”
14
 Marshall went on to battle the President over military appropriations, and 
in this combat he relied heavily on Smith’s reports.  
                                                 
11
 Truman Smith, 84. 
12
 Ibid., xviii.  
13
 Ibid., xvii. 
14
 Lindbergh, 872. 
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Bernard Baruch was a chief economic adviser to the President and was widely 
known for having Roosevelt’s ear. As one of the only real “middle-men” in the politics 
surrounding Smith’s story, Baruch is an interesting figure. Baruch was well liked by the 
Roosevelt administration as well as the administration’s isolationist opponents.
15
 Baruch 
described himself as somewhat “obsessed with the subject of preparedness.”
16
 The 
reports Smith was submitting were not only being circulated widely enough that they 
reached Baruch, an economic consultant to the President, but Baruch actively used 
Smith’s reports in some of what he calls the “many occasions I was pressing him (FDR) 
to take more decisive preparedness measures,”
17
 from 1936 through 1940. The value of 
the support Smith received from Marshall and Baruch cannot be overstated. 
Despite this support, one of the chief criticisms of Smith prior to 1937 was that 
“some of his reports had exaggerated the strength of German forces, especially the air 
force, in comparison with the reports of the British and French.”
18
 The perceived 
reliability of foreign attachés was about as reputable as that of American attachés. 
Vincent Orange writes in the Journal of Military History that “British intelligence 
departments in the 1930s were short of staff, funds, equipment, and prestige. There were 
far too many of them, they refused to cooperate with one another, and they had little 
influence on decision makers, civilian or military.”
19
 This status was quite similar to that 
of the American attaché corps, and the British attachés in Berlin handled their lack of 
prestige differently than Smith did.  
                                                 
15
 Bernard Baruch, The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 307. 
16
 Ibid., 276. 
17
 Ibid., 276-279. 
18
 Truman Smith, x. 
19
 Vincent Orange, "The German Air Force Is Already 'The Most Powerful in Europe': Two Royal Air 
Force Officers Report on a Visit to Germany," The Journal of Military History 170, no. 4 (October, 2006): 1015, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4138193. 
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Colonel Andrew Thorne assumed his post as head British military attaché in 
Berlin in 1932. In 1934 and 1935, Thorne reached much different conclusions concerning 
the state of German affairs than Smith would eventually report in 1935 and 1936. Thorne 
reported that he felt the German army operated separately from Hitler’s rule. He went on 
to conclude that military leaders in Germany were not particularly loyal to Hitler and 
could put a stop to Hitler’s regime at any moment.
20
 Smith could not have disagreed 
more; in fact, in his memoirs, Smith incredulously recalls a conversation he had with the 
Supreme Commander of the German Luftwaffe Hermann Goering near the end of his 
time in Berlin: “With moist eyes and a voice tinged with emotion, he turned to the attaché 
(Smith) and said, ‘Smith, there are only three truly great characters in all history: Buddha, 
Jesus Christ, and Adolf Hitler.’”
21
 Smith was immediately struck by the fanatical 
devotion and support Hitler possessed. As early as the 1922 Smith noted about Hitler: 
“So intense and dramatic were the times, and so well did Hitler understand how to play 
on the emotions of his audiences, that the lack of logic in his message was often entirely 
overlooked.”
22
 Though they were proven false not long after they were submitted, 
Thorne’s reports of divided German leadership did damage the influence of Smith’s early 
reports from Berlin in 1935 and 1936. 
In addition, when Colonel F.E. Hotblack took over Thorne’s post in Berlin in 
1935, he entered with the expectation Thorne had left for him. From 1935 through early 
1937, Hotblack’s reports became less and less consistent with Thorne’s. By late 1937 
when Smith submitted his most meaningful report, “The General Air Estimate of 
                                                 
20
 Wesley Wark, "Three Military Attachés at Berlin in the 1930s: Soldier-Statesmen and the Limits of 
Ambiguity," The International History Review 9, no. 4 (November, 1987): 592, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40105843. 
21
 Truman Smith, 100. 
22
 Ibid., 70. 
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November 1, 1937”, Hotblack’s intelligence was in complete support of Smith. At the 
time Smith submitted his General Air Estimate in 1937, Hotblack was submitting reports 
to British Intelligence claiming that Germany would be prepared for an all-out offensive 
against Europe within two years.
23
 
By 1937, contradictory foreign intelligence was not an obstacle for Smith to 
overcome. Prior to 1937, however, contradictory reports impacted the reception of 
Smith’s reports in a major way. Thorne’s reports fueled an already raging problem in the 
perception of Germany held by the United States as well as Great Britain from 1933 to 
1937, which greatly impeded the impact of Smith’s reports. The idea that the Nazi state 
was deeply divided was one of the worst assumptions made prior to World War II. In 
seemingly wishful thinking, much of the world’s leadership became convinced that “a 
policy of negotiated and limited readjustment to the international status quo would be 
welcomed within the Third Reich.”
24
 This act of self-deception proved to be extremely 
harmful, and it brings up another problem Smith faced in Berlin at the hands of the 
United States ambassador, Dr. William Dodd. 
Dodd was well known to be a pacifist who had a “marked distaste for military 
matters.”
25
 He did not like to associate himself with military men; instead, the doctor 
enjoyed the company of professors in Germany. He had no confidence in Army and 
Naval attachés in Berlin: “Army and Navy attachés here, and I think all over Europe, are 
utterly unequal to their supposed functions.”
26
 Dodd consistently battled the idea that 
Germany was militarizing. Even when the military attaché preceding Smith, Colonel 
                                                 
23
 Wark, 599. 
24
 Ibid., 593. 
25
 Truman Smith, 76. 
26
 Vagts, 71. 
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Wuest, raised the alarm and tried to alert the United States that Germany was mobilizing 
for war, Dodd insisted that Wuest was overly excited, and what Wuest had to say was not 
even worth listening to.
27
 While Dodd asserted that Wuest and Smith were both alarmist, 
he was proven wrong when the Germans took over the Rhineland in 1936. This risky act 
from Hitler, which Smith reported would happen a few days beforehand, completely 
shocked Dodd.
28
 
The well-educated ambassador had long been a critic of Hitler, but despite his 
criticism, he completely underestimated the fiery dictator. When news broke that Hitler 
had indeed moved into the Rhineland just as Smith had predicted, Dodd abandoned his 
fellow diplomats to discuss his disgust at Hitler with his professor friends. In the process, 
Dodd found that his cohorts were in fact Nazis themselves, a fact that shocked and 
appalled the ambassador to the extent that he hid himself inside his study. This event 
caused Dodd to become disgusted with military matters in general, to the extent that he 
would not even appear with any American military officers if they were in their uniforms. 
This behavior lasted, at the cost of tax-payers’ dollars, until his dismissal from his post 
for inadequate performance in late 1937.
29
  
This complete underestimation of Hitler exhibited by Dodd represents a much 
wider feeling within the United State government in the 1930s. The impact of Smith’s 
reports was compromised not only by Dodd, but also by the general lack of concern with 
German military build-up present in much of the United States. When Smith began his 
post in 1935 in Berlin, the global politics were in a complicated stage in which all 
                                                 
27
 Ibid., 71. 
28
 Kay Smith, 83-85. 
29
 Ibid., 86. 
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military intelligence needed to be carefully weighed and considered. Instead, Smith 
recalls that at no point during his time in Berlin did Dr. Dodd ever ask any information 
from Smith on German developments.
30
 This attitude exhibited by Dodd explains much 
of why Smith’s reports from 1935 and 1936 were ignored.  
In reality, though Smith consistently reported on German mobilization for his 
entire service in Berlin, his reports in 1937 and 1938 offer the most insight into the state 
of the United States government at the time. Several barriers stood in the way of Smith’s 
reports in 1935 and 1936, but by 1937, these obstacles had been conquered. In 1937, 
Dodd had lost credibility, Smith had gained immense support from his military superiors, 
and Smith gained a new assistant air attaché, Major Albert Vanaman, who possessed top 
of the line aeronautical expertise.
31
 Considering these factors, along with the support he 
received from Baruch and Marshall, when Smith submitted the most important report of 
his service in Berlin, his “General Air Estimate of November 1, 1937,” it effectively had 
a direct path to the highest levels of the Roosevelt administration. The continued poor 
reception Smith’s reports received ultimately give insight into domestic political 
priorities in the 1930’s, the ultimate hindrance impacting Smith’s intelligence efforts. 
1937-1938 – Domestic Priorities 
Hitler’s rise to power in Germany stands as one of the most gravely 
underestimated events in history. Across the globe, Hitler was regarded as little more 
than a dupe by many. Even in Germany, Franz Von Papen, who convinced President Paul 
von Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as chancellor, was so confident that Hitler was weak 
                                                 
30
 Truman Smith, 77. 
31
 Ibid., 106. 
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and could easily be controlled that he boldly claimed: “Within two months we will have 
pushed Hitler so far into the corner that he’ll squeak!”
32
 Events, of course, went much 
differently than Papen anticipated, and while Hitler was being underestimated in 
Germany, a comical image was simultaneously being created of him in the United States. 
One of the starts of the outrageous picture of Hitler came from the book I Saw 
Hitler by Dorothy Thompson. In her book, which stemmed from her 1931 interview with 
the soon-to-be leader of Germany, Thompson clearly and colorfully described Hitler as 
feminine, socially backward, and mentally fragile.
33
 Thompson also openly questioned 
Hitler’s ability to lead; she states in her writing that entering her interview: “I was 
convinced that I was meeting the future dictator of Germany. In something less than fifty 
seconds I was quite sure that I was not.”
34
 Time magazine also reported on Hitler as a 
silly figure, making light of his appearance as a “pudgy, stoop-shouldered man” and 
highlighting anything strange about him.
35
 Time also went on to fuel an unfortunate and 
common misconception that the Nazi party was “pledged to so many things that it is 
pledged to nothing.”
36
 This perception of Hitler was quite common in the United States in 
the mid-1930s and ultimately reduced the impact of Smith’s reports, as well as detracted 
from the plight of Jews in America and in Germany.  
The common doubt over the seriousness of Hitler’s regime was a major detriment 
to Smith and his reports. With the exception of Jews, the majority of Americans were 
unconcerned with Hitler. In addition, the concerns and protests voiced by Jews in 
                                                 
32
 Gordon Craig, Germany 1866-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 570. 
33
 Dorothy Thompson, I Saw Hitler, (New York: J.J. Little and Ives Company, 1932), 14,16. 
34
 Ibid., 13. 
35
 "Hitler Into Chancellor,” Time, February 2, 1933, 22. 
36
 Ibid., 22. 
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America ultimately did as much harm to their own cause as it helped. Rabbis openly 
criticized Hitler and predicted that he would lead the world to another world war.
37
 On 
May 11
th
 1933, fifty-thousand Jews even gathered in Chicago to protest the oppression 
against Jews in Germany.
38
 Though this protest actually did not have a huge effect on the 
public, it did touch Edith Rodgers, a Massachusetts Republican in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. On May 13
th
, two days after the protest, Rodgers voiced in the House 
her feeling that the United States should intervene in Germany to aid the suffering Jews 
there.
39
 Directly after Rodgers addressed the House with her opinion, however, the 
President released a statement emphasizing that any actions by the Nazis were strictly 
European affairs.
40
 
The public was generally in favor of this isolationist policy. Anti-Jewish 
sentiments were extremely common in the United States in the pre-World War II era,
41
 
which combined with a Nazi propaganda barrage to eliminate much of the sympathy 
Americans had for German Jews. Truman Smith recalls in his memoirs that Hitler was 
outspoken in his speeches against the Jews, but that the common belief was his violent 
rhetoric was exclusively for propaganda purposes, and that the dictator would never 
actually become too abusive to Jews.
42
  
                                                 
37
 "Rabbis Denounce Hitler in Sermons,” The New York Times, March 26, 1933, 28. 
38
 "50,000 Jews Unite in Chicago Protest.” The New York Times, May 11, 1933, 10. 
39
 “Scores Hitler in House,” New York Times, May 13, 1933, pg. 7. 
40
 “U.S. Views Nazi Aim as Europe’s Affair,” Wall Street Journal, May 15, 1933, pg. 4. 
41
 John Elson and Daniel Levy, "Did F.D.R. Do Enough?" Time 143, no. 16 (April 14, 1994): 83, EBSCO 
Academic Search Premier (9404127685). 
42
 Truman Smith, ix, 55. 
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Jewish businessmen also had their own scheme turned against them by the Nazis 
when they attempted to boycott German goods on a global scale.
43
 Before Jews began 
implementing this boycott, the Nazis had already begun issuing “warnings” to Jews in 
general, stating that if they kept up their “treachery”, there would be major 
ramifications.
44
 After the boycott was implemented, the Nazis launched their counter-
attack, claiming that by boycotting German goods, the Jews were simply extending their 
treachery. The Nazis further decided to reciprocate and boycott Jewish goods and 
services and to begin removing more Jews from positions of importance.
45
 
While the nation was being influenced by German propaganda, President 
Roosevelt was actually aware of the true story in Germany. Dr. Dodd reported to the 
President on the abuses that German Jews were experiencing, but Roosevelt responded 
that the Jews were essentially on their own.
46
  While much of the public simply was not 
sure what to think about Nazi Germany, the President was aware of the situation and 
chose to place his New Deal as the main priority of the United States government.  
To those whom history remembers as the “New Dealers,” the New Deal 
represented much more than the social reform it literally entailed; it represented hope that 
democracy was still a viable system of government. In the midst of dictatorships and 
communism, Roosevelt wanted to turn his New Deal into somewhat of a “shining light” 
for democracy.
47
 Roosevelt wanted his program to rise above the attacks from his 
opponents, who called the New Deal the “Jew Deal” and questioned Roosevelt’s 
                                                 
43
 “Boycott Threat Facing Germany,” The Wall Street Journal, March 25, 1933. 
44
 "Hitler Warns Jews,” The Wall Street Journal, March 20, 1933. 
45
 "More Jews to Go,” The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 1933, 4. 
46
 Duffy, 68-69. 
47
 Jordan Schwarz, The New Dealers, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), xvi-xvii. 
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motives.
48
 In hopes of preserving his New Deal’s funding from being spent elsewhere in 
response to escalated arms concerns, the President put much of his faith in global 
disarmament as a foreign policy strategy. 
The President put a large amount of effort into pushing disarmament to preserve 
peace. Those who advocated for military preparedness, many of whom were isolationists, 
did not agree with Roosevelt on arms.
49
 Bernard Baruch is recorded as quoting: “Peace 
does not follow disarmament; disarmament follows peace.”
50
 This policy of Roosevelt’s 
did what he wanted it to do, however, because it allowed him to justify postponing much 
needed military funding and slash military appropriations to create funds to dump into the 
New Deal. 
Though eventually they faded behind larger events in history surrounding World 
War II, many criticisms arose against the President because of how he handled Smith’s 
reports. Smith described the press coverage of his activities with Lindbergh in Berlin to 
be highly inaccurate. He believed that the press simplified German affairs and 
contributed to the misconception that Germany was weak and divided. Despite this, the 
fact remains that they did receive substantial exposure in the press because of the 
presence of Lindbergh.
51
 As Smith’s reports began being covered up by the Roosevelt 
administration, General Marshall even went so far as to submit Smith’s reports to 
external political figures who were not afraid to battle the Roosevelt administration in 
                                                 
48
 Ibid., 129. 
49
 Justus Doenecke, "Toward an Isolationist Braintrust: The Foundation for Foreign Affairs" World Affairs 
143, no. 3 (Winter 1980/1981): 264-277. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20671864. 
50
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order to keep the reports from being completely forgotten and to prevent the work of 
Smith going unrecognized.
52
  
Almost entirely due to this action taken by General Marshall, accusations 
developed that the President had purposefully withheld Smith’s reports from Congress in 
order to remove them as a barrier to slashing the military appropriations.
53
 These 
accusations climaxed when Representative Albert Engel, a Michigan Republican, 
provided well-documented evidence that showed how the President cut the annual 
military appropriations by forty million dollars, despite having been aware of Smith’s 
reports.
54
 Though Smith recalls Engel’s attack on the President as being of a completely 
partisan nature, the fact remains that Roosevelt was adamant that the New Deal needed to 
take priority, even when it meant sweeping Smith’s unprecedented but unpalatable 
reports under the rug.
55
  
Events surrounding Smith’s reports offer insight into the Roosevelt administration 
and the battle for military appropriations that raged through the 1930s. The President 
opposed heavy military spending up until 1938 when the Sudeten crisis and Kristallnacht 
began to impact the views of American citizens. As Nazi aggression became to be more 
apparent, and Nazi troops trashed Jewish businesses and abused their owners, American 
public opinion began to see past the propaganda war Germany had launched against the 
Jews.
56
 Public opinion shifted even further against the Nazis when in 1939 and 1940, the 
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Germans overran Poland, Denmark and Norway.
57
 Finally, in the summer of 1940, when 
Germany began attacking Western Europe, General Marshall successfully acquired 
sufficient funding for the military to begin preparing for the possibility of conflict.
58
 
The extensive fight and delay over the military appropriations is explained in 
three primary reasons by Bernard Baruch in his diaries. First, Baruch explains that 
Roosevelt was essentially a control freak, and he liked having leverage over his 
subordinates. A second reason was actually that the President was weary of industry 
dominating the economy, an issue he felt like could happen if large military spending was 
instituted. The third factor Baruch lists is that Roosevelt did not want to stir the pot 
before the election in which he ran for his third term.
59
 
Indeed, the military suffered mightily at the hands of the domestic politics. 
General Marshall thought the narrow-mindedness of politicians was handicapping the 
military and felt it was important for the United States to be ready for war.
60
 Similarly to 
Marshall’s feelings concerning the military, Bernard Baruch was quite concerned with 
the inadequacy of the American military.
61
 Baruch also mentions, however, that the 
President was also quite aware and concerned about how unprepared the United States 
would be if attacked.
62
 This presents an interesting quandary; the President slashed 
military budgets to create more funds for his New Deal, but he also harbored concerns of 
preparedness, and wanted to “shake Americans from their isolationist delusions before it 
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was too late.”
63
 If Roosevelt was concerned with military preparedness, and wanted to act 
against isolationism, why would he cover up Truman Smith’s reports? If anything, one 
would think Roosevelt could have used Smith’s reports as evidence to support military 
buildup.  
The largest reason for Roosevelt’s action concerning Smith’s reports came down 
to the same factor that many of the President’s decisions hinged on: timing. Exactly at 
what point the Roosevelt administration’s agenda changed from an isolationist one to an 
interventionist one is a topic for another paper, but one point is clear, and that is the 
President was extremely mindful of timing in relation to where public opinion rested at a 
particular point in time. In the mid-1930s, regardless of how concerned Roosevelt was 
with the military, the New Deal received “top legislative priority” over foreign policy 
decisions and “the outside world would have to fend for itself.”
64
 This attitude is 
consistent with how the President responded to the fifty-thousand Jews that protested 
against the Nazis in Chicago in 1933. The President had certainly shifted gears, however, 
by the late 1930s, when he began his attempt to sway public opinion in favor of war.
65
  
If Smith’s timing in Berlin had been slightly different, his story would be 
remembered in a much different way and may have changed the course of world history. 
Instead, Smith’s reports were consistently at odds with the President’s agenda. In 1935 
and 1936, Smith’s reports contradicted the cuts Roosevelt wanted to implement to 
military funding, and in 1937 through 1938, Smith’s reports did not line up with the 
complex plan Roosevelt put in place to systematically shift public opinion. Smith’s 
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reports came across as abrupt and startling, and the President was against shocking the 
public.   
A major problem Smith saw in military intelligence was the robotic nature of 
aeronautical reports. In his memoirs Smith described air reports as “so bulky, statistical, 
and technical that anyone who read them needed both leisure and training in all branches 
of aeronautical knowledge to absorb their information.”
66
 In his “General Air Estimate of 
November 1, 1937,” Smith aimed to create a “brief, all inclusive, and couched in 
dramatic rather than technical terms” summary of Germany air progress.
67
 Smith 
certainly succeeded in this effort, providing the War Department with a relatively brief 
but detailed overview of the German Luftwaffe and its immense development. Lindbergh 
was a vital part in the preparation of this report, and his influence is clear when reading it. 
The language is dramatic, to the point and would be understandable to nearly any reader. 
Dramatic reports on German might, however, were the last things Roosevelt wanted to 
reach the public. 
Indeed, alarming reports of the huge air power in Germany could incite panic in 
the United States. The political weight of air superiority at the time cannot be 
underestimated. Just before World War II, the world was transitioning into a time when, 
as Lindbergh stated: “We can no longer protect our families with an army. Our libraries, 
our museums, every institution we value most, are laid bare to bombardment.”
68
 
Considering the vast concern and fear surrounding air power, the President did not want 
any shocking news to develop and panic the public.   
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A prime goal of the President was to keep the public calm. He “deliberately 
sought, with the collaboration of the mass media, to avoid controversy and to stifle 
national debate.”
69
 Roosevelt ultimately wanted to stifle any shocking news, and he 
pushed propaganda that tried to illustrate that the government leaders in America were 
more than capable of handling any complex foreign policy decisions that came their way. 
Rather than pushing the public into anxiety over the unsettling events of the world, 
Roosevelt succeeded in producing a “dull, steady, pervasive drum of preparedness 
information emanating from every popular source of public education.”
70
 Roosevelt 
manipulated the press in order to essentially “sell” his administration. 
Roosevelt’s interference in the media went as far as to force the removal of press 
figures that were critical of his administration’s foreign policy stances. One of the most 
notable instances of the President’s influence on the media was when the White House 
caused the removal of one of CBS’s most popular news commentators, Boake Carter, for 
being critical of the Roosevelt administration. In contrast, figures that were far more 
derogatory towards the President’s rivals than Carter was against the administration, like 
Walter Winchell, were praised.
 71
 Ultimately, the President saw foreign policy issues 
leading up to World War II to be too serious to be up for debate. Roosevelt thought he 
knew what was best for the United States and aimed to influence the public into offering 
the least amount of resistance to his agenda as possible.
72
 Considering the President’s 
attitude, the motive for covering up Smith’s reports is clear. In his effort to impress 
German buildup on American leadership, Smith actually doomed his own reports, 
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because they were too alarming and unpalatable to be utilized in the Roosevelt 
administration’s agenda. 
Smith ultimately found himself at constant odds with the Roosevelt 
administration. If his reports being contrary to the agenda of the administration were not 
enough, Smith’s association with Lindbergh ultimately caused him to be dragged into a 
fierce political battle. The rivalry between Lindbergh and Roosevelt had a deeply 
polarizing impact in the United States population. The rhetoric on both sides was 
radically misrepresentative of the other side, and Smith was made a target for his 
relationship with Lindbergh. 
1939-1940 – Political Strife 
Starting heavily in the summer of 1940, Smith began being attacked by several 
members in the Roosevelt administration as a Nazi sympathizer. Though labeled as a 
sympathizer, these accusations were fueled less by actual suspicions of Nazi sympathy 
and more so by a political grudge. The impact Smith’s relationship with Lindbergh had 
on these attacks cannot be underestimated. Smith was dragged into a confrontation that 
started as early as 1934. In early 1934, after an investigation into corruption in 
commercial air lines and their contracts involving air mail, Roosevelt ordered an 
immediate halt on all commercial air mail. The task of transporting airmail he handed 
entirely to the Army. This order turned out to be a tremendous mistake by the President, 
and one of which Lindbergh quickly became a vocal opponent. Lindbergh, who at the 
time possessed fame and influence not matched by even the most famous of celebrities 
today, immediately spoke out against the President’s painting of all commercial airlines 
with the same brush. Most of all, Lindbergh warned against the policy and predicted that 
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Roosevelt’s hasty action compromised the safety of untrained Army airmen who were 
being volunteered for the airmail service.
73
 
Between February 1934, when Roosevelt instituted his ban on commercial 
airmail, and April 1934, twelve airmen had been killed due to their lack of training. By 
the summer, Roosevelt’s ban on commercial airmail had effectively been lifted, and the 
entire situation “constituted a personal defeat for Roosevelt in the court of public 
opinion.”
74
 This interaction between Lindbergh and Roosevelt proved to be the beginning 
of a conflict which soon tore much of the country apart. 
Roosevelt generally discredited any of his opposition as either ignorant or 
unpatriotic. Lindbergh certainly received this treatment. The President’s priority through 
it all was to eliminate forces that would undermine his sway on public opinion. Roosevelt 
was extremely concerned with “not getting ahead” of public thought. In general, the 
President’s agendas were fairly open-ended.
75
 Rather than push detailed plans, Roosevelt 
tried to steer public opinion to where he thought it should be. This typical political 
strategy was not compatible with conflicting viewpoints. Alarming forces that could 
disrupt his efforts were either covered up, like Smith’s reports, or combatted, like 
Lindbergh’s rhetoric. When Lindbergh began giving his isolationist speeches, he was 
even approached with a bribe from the President. If Lindbergh decided to halt his 
speeches, the President would create a new Cabinet position for him.
76
 Whether through 
bribery or smear campaigns, Roosevelt did everything he could to silence or discredit his 
opposition. These methods aimed at Lindbergh ultimately spilled over onto Smith. 
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In his memoirs, Smith lists influential gossip columnist and radio broadcaster 
Walter Winchell among his antagonists.
77
 Winchell was opposed to everything 
isolationist. As he accused Lindbergh, who he named the “Lone Ostrich,” of being a 
Nazi, Winchell also sent messages to Roosevelt claiming that Smith was an “advisor on 
the Lindbergh speeches” and called Smith a “terrific Pro-Nazi.”
78
 Famous broadcaster 
and journalist Dorothy Thompson, who like Smith was one of the earliest voices to speak 
out against Hitler, was openly skeptical of Smith as well.
79
  The popular columnist and 
critic of public figures Drew Pearson was also outspoken about the questions surrounding 
Smith’s allegiances.
80
  
Smith was effectively lumped into the isolationist group which was being blasted 
in the media. Though some columnists directly attacked Smith, he also felt the pressure 
of the polar media war occurring in the United States. From gossip columnists to news 
broadcasters to even cartoonists, the media lost all objectivity. Even Dr. Seuss took 
merciless shots at Lindbergh. In his cartoons, Dr. Seuss repeatedly portrayed isolationists 
with the popular image of ostriches with their heads in the sand. Further than this, 
however, Seuss had multiple images published portraying Lindbergh as being in league 
with Nazi Germany.
81
  
In addition to these influential members of the press who openly doubted Smith’s 
patriotism, many more columnists simply lumped Smith in with their criticisms of 
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Lindbergh. Shortly after Smith returned to the United States, Lindbergh began a long 
campaign to spread isolationism, in which he delivered speeches that were broadcasted 
across the nation and internationally in many instances. These opinionated broadcasts 
quickly became surrounded in controversy as the nation became split down the middle 
between isolationists and interventionists. Many columnists, particularly ones who had 
more liberal stances, were quick to point out how fond the Germans were of Lindbergh, 
and how all of his speeches were broadcasted and cheered for by Nazis.
82
 The extensive 
smearing of Lindbergh eventually created a perception of Smith that essentially made 
him “guilty by association” and made him receive most of the “echoed accusations that 
were hurled at Lindbergh.”
83
    
Smith was similarly associated with Lindbergh by prominent members of the 
Roosevelt administration. Among those whom Smith called the “New Dealers who 
wanted his scalp” were figures like Supreme Court Justice and personal friend of 
Roosevelt, Felix Frankfurter, who Smith claimed was fueling some of the press attacks.
84
 
White House Press Secretary under Roosevelt, Stephen Early, also spoke out against 
Smith.
85
 Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, another critic, even approached 
General George Marshall to request that Smith be discharged from the Army.
86
  
Likely the most vocal opponent of Smith from the Roosevelt administration, 
however, was Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. Smith recalls an instance in 1940 
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where Ickes, along with Justice Frankfurter, suggested to the President that Smith should 
be court-martialed.
87
 Ickes helped to lead a unit in the Roosevelt administration which 
tracked the President’s rivals.
88
 Lindbergh described Ickes’ actions as “spreading 
misinformation” in the “cheapest and most inexcusable sort of way.”
89
 The pressure 
being put on Smith was intense enough that Smith and his wife Kay became convinced 
they were being spied on and had their phones tapped.
90
  
The 1940 press attacks on Smith did not end until Bernard Baruch convinced the 
President to order a halt on the smear campaign. Baruch did this in league with General 
Marshall.
91
 Ickes did not give up, though; shortly after the President ordered a halt on 
members of the administration fueling press attacks on Smith, Ickes orchestrated a new 
attack. Smith soon found himself the subject of an investigation, because it had been 
reported Smith insulted and questioned the intelligence of the President at a cocktail 
party. This fabrication was later discovered to have been devised by Ickes, and was 
utterly disproven.
92
  
The heightened aggressiveness of Ickes was largely due to his staunch opposition 
to racism. Ickes was a vocal opponent of racial discrimination of all kinds,
93
 and as 
history has documented well, much of Lindbergh’s rhetoric was racially charged. 
Lindbergh was quite vocal in blaming Jews for trying to agitate the American public into 
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moving towards war.
94
 Ickes made it a priority to try to disrupt and nullify anything that 
had to do with Lindbergh. In his diary, Ickes expresses great jubilance when his smear 
campaign began to crawl under Lindbergh’s skin.
95
 In correspondence between Ickes and 
Roosevelt, Ickes described Lindbergh as a “ruthless and conscious fascist, motivated by a 
hatred for you personally and a contempt for democracy in general,” to which the 
President responded: “What you say about Lindbergh and the potential danger of the 
man, I agree with wholeheartedly.”
96
 The seriousness of these feelings toward Lindbergh 
deeply impacted the perception of Smith in the Roosevelt administration. The FBI even 
kept a record of Smith in their file on Charles Lindbergh, in which they list Smith among 
potential threats as allegedly being “strangely pro-Nazi.”
97
 Ickes and his fellow critics felt 
they were doing their country a service by exposing those who, in their minds, were Nazi 
sympathizers.
98
  
The overall theme of Smith’s career tends to be that an outstanding military man 
was dragged into politics against his will. Much like his patron General Marshall, who 
tried his hardest to remain separated from partisan politics, Smith maintained a marked 
aloofness to politics.
99
 Even when he found himself being ridiculed and smeared, Smith 
kept his cool. During the attacks on him, Smith never once even responded. Throughout 
the attacks, Smith kept his head down and did his duty, and trusted General Marshall to 
take care of the attacks.
100
 Though much of the small amount of history that includes 
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Smith will remember him as “that guy” who brought Lindbergh to Germany, Smith’s 
career offers a variety of learning opportunities.  
Conclusion 
While contemporary sources try to isolate reasons why Smith’s reports were 
covered up, the reality remains that the poor reception of his reports was due to a diverse 
collection of domestic political factors. Smith was swept into political rivalries, and the 
value of his intelligence efforts was diminished. Smith’s case and the fate of his reports 
remind us that the polarized nature of politics in the early 21
st
 century is hardly unique.  
Even today, opinions vary concerning the events surrounding Smith’s career. 
Many of these differences relate directly to the diversity in views on the rivalry between 
Roosevelt and Lindbergh. The majority of research conducted specifically on Smith’s 
career tell a story of a dutiful officer who was treated unfairly by the Roosevelt 
administration; however, not all contemporary sources agree. Though the research 
focused on Smith is limited, examinations of the rivalry between Lindbergh and 
Roosevelt are not. In these works, Smith is often mentioned in passing, but these brief 
glimpses of his career are skewed based on the biases of the author concerned. In the 
majority of contemporary work, Smith is paired with Lindbergh; thus, the perception of 
Lindbergh is key in the portrayal Smith receives. Some authors praise Lindbergh’s 
contributions to Smith’s intelligence effort and subsequently admire Smith’s 
performance. Others label Lindbergh as the Roosevelt administration did, as a Nazi 
sympathizer, and include Smith in their accusations.  
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Charles Lindbergh stands as one of the most polarizing public figures in 
American history. Even today, historians bicker on whether or not he contributed to the 
United States or was little more than a traitor. These issues were magnified in the years 
leading up to World War II and ultimately caused Smith’s intelligence work to be pushed 
aside  in the midst of debates about matters other than the substance of his reports.  
Looking back, Smith is not shy to admit his short comings. In his memoirs, Smith 
describes how his intelligence office completely overlooked the development of German 
missile technology. In addition, Smith recalls that through much of the early stages of 
German military buildup, the nature of German air tactics escaped him. Air forces had 
never before been utilized to support ground forces, and Smith did not realize the Nazi 
regime planned to use their mighty Luftwaffe in this way until late 1937. Smith considers 
this oversight a massive blunder in his memoirs.
101
   
Despite these failures, the successes of Smith’s intelligence efforts cannot be 
underestimated. Though his work on the German Luftwaffe is generally the focus of 
research due to Lindbergh’s involvement, Smith also reported on German ground forces. 
The intelligence turned into the United States government regarding German ground 
forces by Smith was profoundly accurate. In addition to this, the work Smith 
accomplished on German air developments, with the help of Lindbergh, remained 
unprecedented. Smith was not without faults during his service, but his utilization of 
Lindbergh caused his intelligence to yield much more meaningful results than his foreign 
counterparts in Berlin. Despite the stellar content of Smith’s reports, the United States 
government remained aloof to the gravity of Germany’s military expansion.  
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In the early 21
st
 century, politics remain one of the most polarizing topics in 
existence. Vicious political disputes often take center stage in American politics over 
meaningful events occurring both domestically and internationally. Smith’s story clearly 
shows this dividing effect is hardly a new occurrence. In addition, this case study offers 
as a cautionary tale about the importance of listening to opposing viewpoints, and it also 
gives insight into the dangers of allowing policy making to hinge on political agendas.    
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